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Pricing Fed Cattle on a Grid: An Analysis of the Incentive Mechanism over Time 
Abstract  
   
Empirical results suggest that the grid premium and discount structure is slowly adjusting 
carcass quality incentive/disincentive market signals to encourage marketing on a grid and 
discourage marketing by the pen.  If this trend continues, grid market share of steer and heifer 
slaughter volume should increase in the future.  
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Pricing Fed Cattle on a Grid: An Analysis of the Incentive Mechanism over Time  
Introduction: 
The beef industry has experienced relatively weak demand and declining market share for its 
product over the last thirty years (Tonsor 2011).  The beef industry, however, has not remained 
passive in the face of weak demand and the loss of market share to pork and poultry. The beef 
industry responded by suggesting production and marketing reforms along its entire supply 
chain. The stated goal of these suggested reforms is to transform the beef industry into a value-
based industry. The blueprint of this initiative is outlined in an industry sponsored white paper: 
War on Fat released by the Value Based Marketing Task Force (VBMTF 1990).   
A key component of the initiative is the call for the development of a value based pricing 
system. In the early 1990s the industry began the conversion from the traditional “Grade and 
Yield” pricing system for fed cattle into what is commonly referred to today as grid pricing. The 
goal of the beef industry‟s movement toward value based pricing is to improve the flow of 
information from the consumer to the producer so that the industry is producing the “right 
product at the right price to meet consumer demand” (Fausti et al. 2010a: p. 19). 
The grid pricing literature (e.g., Schroeder and Graff 2000; Fausti and Qasmi 2002; 
McDonald and Schroeder 2003; Johnson and Ward 2005) has investigated and discussed in great 
detail the effectiveness of the grid pricing system to transmit market signals to producers with 
respect to carcass quality.  This literature has also discussed potential barriers to the potential 
across-the-board producer adoption of grid pricing (e.g., Fausti et al. 1998; Belasco et al. 2010). 
Several studies have attempted to estimate grid market share of fed cattle slaughter volume (e.g., 
Schroeder et al. 2002; Muth et al. 2007; Fausti et.al 2010a) to determine the level of industry 
adoption of the grid pricing system.  However, up to this point, empirical evidence on if the 
incentive structure of the grid pricing system (since its inception) has become a more effective 
signaling mechanism with respect to carcass quality has not appeared in the literature.  
The objective of this paper is to investigate if the effectiveness of the grid pricing system 
to transmit informative price signals to producers has changed over time. In this study, we 
evaluate grid price signals by comparing carcass quality incentive/disincentive price structure of 
the grid system to selling fed cattle by the pen at an average price.   
Specifically, we simulate per head weekly price (grid and dressed weight) and then derive 
the pen level average price (grid and dressed weight) and the price differential (gird minus 
dressed weight) for two pens of slaughter cattle (1500 head per pen) over a 381 week period.  
The two pens differ with respect to carcass quality but individual animal carcass attributes 
remained fixed over the timeframe of the study.  We employ an EGARCH-in-Mean regression 
modeling procedure to analyze price differential variation over time.  Our empirical results 
indicate that the incentive to market high (low) quality cattle on a grid (by the pen) has increased 
(decreased) during the timeframe covered in this study. This finding indicates that the grid 4 
 
pricing system‟s role as a value based pricing system is strengthening.  Furthermore, we 
incorporated the model‟s conditional variance as an explanatory variable and found that market 
risk does affect the incentive structure associated with the decision to market on a grid or by the 
pen. The incorporation of price volatility modeling tools into the grid pricing literature reflects a 
contribution to the empirical literature on livestock markets.  
Literature Review:  
Agricultural economists have investigated a number of issues pertaining to the beef industry‟s 
value based marketing (VBM) initiative for slaughter cattle. A general discussion of this 
literature can be found in Fausti et al. (2010a). The success of the value based marketing 
initiative cannot be measured by a single metric. Consumer acceptance can be measured by 
changes in beef demand over time (Schroeder et al. 2000), or investigated using experimental 
methods (e.g., Umberger 2007). Production efficiency, with respect to carcass quality, has been 
investigated in the context of technological innovation to enhance value based beef production 
and marketing methods (e.g. Lusk 2007; Koontz et. al. 2008).   
A white paper (War on Fat) published by the Value Based Marketing Task Force 
(VBMTF 1990) specifically discussed the need for an alternative pricing system to the traditional 
practice of selling fed cattle at an average price by the pen. Selling fed cattle at an average price 
by the pen is viewed by the beef industry (VBMTF: consensus point 7) as an inefficient pricing 
mechanism because it distorts market signals from the consumer to the producer (Feuz et al. 
1993) with respect to carcass quality. The price signal issue arises because selling slaughter 
cattle by the pen at a negotiated price per hundred weight allows pricing error to enter into the 
transaction because carcass quality: a) is unknown at the time of the transaction, and b) is not 
uniform across all animals in a pen. Thus, animals with desirable carcass attributes are paid the 
same price per pound as animals with undesirable carcass attributes. Thus, low quality cattle are 
being paid a premium above their actual market value, and high quality cattle are being penalized 
by being paid a price per pound below their actual market value. The implication is that 
producers who sell by the pen do not receive a price signal on carcass quality differences for the 
animals they market within a pen.  
The introduction of grid pricing mechanisms (GPM) as a value-based pricing system 
alternative to pen level sales (Fausti et al. 1998) reflects the beef industry‟s desire to improve 
carcass quality through the market mechanism. Grid pricing mechanisms have been touted by the 
beef industry and academic researchers as a key component in the development of a value based 
marketing system for fed cattle (Schroeder et al. 1998). The goal of a grid pricing system is to 
provide an incentive/disincentive mechanism that rewards desirable carcass attributes and 
discounts undesirable carcass attributes, thus providing a market signal that will encourage 
producers to improve carcass quality. 5 
 
Agricultural economists have investigated effectiveness of GPM as a price transmission 
mechanism from consumers to producers (e.g., McDonald and Schroeder 2003; Johnson and 
Ward 2005 & 2006). The general consensus is that carcass weight rather than grid premiums and 
discounts assigned to carcass quality attributes is still a very important component of the GPM 
price signal.  Johnson and Ward (2006) report that for cattle with the highest (lowest) carcass 
quality sold on a grid, weight accounted for 79% (50%) of the market signal. Furthermore, they 
report that grid discounts account for 20% and 49.5% of the market signal for high quality and 
the low quality cattle groups in their study, respectively. Their findings are consistent with earlier 
studies that have raised the issue that the GPM premium and discount structure may act as a 
“barrier to adoption” of grid pricing by producers (e.g., Fausti and Qasmi 2002).  
The goal of the VBM initiative is to transform the beef industry‟s production and 
marketing system along the entire supply chain. To accomplish this goal, a VBM pricing system 
needs to capture a dominant share of fed cattle sales. While grid marketing has increased in 
importance as a pricing method for fed cattle over the last fifteen years, it has not replaced 
average pricing by the pen as the dominant marketing option selected by fed cattle producers.  
Fausti et al. (2010a) provides empirical estimates that grid market share of steer and heifer 
slaughter has increased from the low teens in the 1990s to approximately 45% in 2009. The 
inability of the grid pricing system to capture a dominant share of fed cattle slaughter implies a 
weakness in the incentive mechanism.    
Conceptually, an important objective of GPM as an integral component of a value based 
marketing system is to induce fed cattle producers to sell their cattle on a grid. The benefits to 
producers who sell on a grid touted by the beef industry are: a) producers will be rewarded for 
the above average cattle they sell on a grid, and b) producers will be given detailed information 
on the quality of each individual carcass by the packer. Carcass information and the premiums 
represent the gird market signal to the producer that is absent when cattle are sold at an average 
price by the pen. In turn, the producer will make adjustments to his/her production system to 
improve the carcass quality of animals sold in the future. However, there is also risk the producer 
must accept. When a producer sells on a grid he/she faces uncertainty concerning the average 
quality of animals they are marketing. This uncertainty creates a financial risk that their cattle 
may be of lower quality than they expected. The reason why this financial risk exits is because; 
producers do have the option of selling their cattle by the pen at an average price. In this case, 
the buyer (packer) assumes the financial risk associated with carcass quality uncertainty (see 
Fausti and Feuz 1995 for additional discussion of this issue).  
The key to accomplishing the beef industry‟s goal of having a dominant value based 
pricing system is dependent on how effective the grid pricing system‟s incentive mechanism is at 
transmitting market signals to producers. A key indicator of success would be if the incentive to 
market higher quality cattle on a grid strengthens and the disincentive to market lower quality 
cattle on a grid weakens. A weakening of the incentive to market lower quality cattle by the pen 
at an average price relative to selling on a grid will encourage producers to increase their use of a 6 
 
grid when marketing fed cattle. In turn, information of grid performance will encourage 
producers to adopt value based production practices. A key metric of success for the beef 
industry‟s value based initiative is a reduction in the “barriers to adoption” of its value based 
pricing system.  
Thus, a logical approach for evaluating the effectiveness of GPM incentive mechanism is 
to compare its performance as a signaling mechanism relative to the alternative pricing methods 
available to producers. Evaluating market outcomes for cattle sold on a grid relative to cattle sold 
live or dressed weight has been a common practice in the grid pricing literature (e.g., Fausti et al. 
1998; Schroeder and Graff 2000; Anderson and Zeuli 2001).  
Data 
Carcass data on 2590 slaughter steers was collected from a retained ownership study conducted 
by South Dakota State University. A random sampling procedure was employed to construct two 
data sets.  The first dataset, labeled “Choice” data, consists of 2/3 choice grade steers and 1/3 
select grade steers, whereas the second dataset (Select) includes 2/3 select grade steers and 1/3 
choice grade steers.
1 Table 1 contains the summary statistics for the two data sets. 
Table 1 
The carcass data was used to simulate weekly per-head market value using both a grid 
pricing system and a dressed weight pricing system. The weekly market simulation was used to 
derive a weekly average for the pen level per-head revenue differential for both pens using a 
matched pairs process.  Weekly grid price per-head was determined using a calculated a weekly 
base price and the weekly AMS additive grid as proposed by Fausti et al. (1998). Weekly grid 
premium and discount data was collected from USDA-AMS weekly report (LM_CT155): 
National Carcass Premiums and Discounts for Slaughter Steers and Heifers.  The pen level 
dressed weight price (typically referred to as Hot Carcass Weight (HCW) price) is the Nebraska 
Weekly Direct Slaughter Cattle-Negotiated Purchases report (LM_CT158). The reported HCW 
price selected is for dressed delivered steers grading 35% to 65% choice. For each week from 
April 2001 to July 2008 (381 weeks) individual steer market values were estimated, matched pair 
differences were calculated (GridRevit – HCWRevit), and pen level averages were calculated to 
derived the variable of interest denoted RevDt for the high and low quality grade pens.
2  
Summary statistics describing the data can be found in tables 2 and 3.  
Tables 2 and 3 
 
                                                       
1 Additional information these data sets can be found in Fausti et al. (1998).  
2 We did not include AMS grid premium and discount data from October 1996 to April 2001 (pre mandatory 
livestock price reporting period) due a recent study by Fausti et al. (2010b). This study suggests that AMS publicly 
reported weekly grid premium and discount data may have been tainted by sample selection bias.  7 
 
Explanatory variables were selected based on potential influence on RevDt.  Given that 
carcass quality is being held constant over time, reported weekly AMS grid premiums and 
discounts, a seasonality dummy variable, and a time trend variable were selected.   Given that 
grid premium and discount prices within the quality grade and yield grade categories are highly 
correlated, we selected the choice/select discount, yield grade 1-2 premium, and the yield grade 5 
discount as the proxies for the grid pricing system in our empirical model.  Note, we converted 
the grid discounts to positive values to simplify interpretation.  
Methodology 
 
We employ an EGARCH-in-Mean regression model to examine the revenue differentials for the 
choice and select datasets. The revenue differential is defined as the pen average of the per-head 
matched pair revenue difference between the AMS grid and the HCW price. Following the price 
discovery literature (Ward 1987, Feuz et al., 1995, Fausti and Feuz, 1995), we consider 
informational disparity over cattle quality and risk aversion of cattle producers as primary factors 
explaining the revenue differentials between the two marketing alternatives. Other important 
factors are included, such as past revenue differentials, the potential trend in preference for the 
AMS grid marketing alternative and seasonal price pattern.     
We propose the following regression for the revenue differential for the choice data: 
1 2 3 4 5 6
1
2 5 ( )
L
t l t l t t t t t t t
l
RevD const RevD selectp yg yg p T DS ln h        

          ò (1) 
where  t RevD , const ,  tl RevD  ,  t selectp ,  2t yg ,  5 t yg p ,  t T ,  t DS  and  t h  are the weekly revenue 
differential, intercept, lagged revenue differential, the choice-select premium, the premium of 
yield grade 2 relative to the benchmark grade, the discount of yield grade 5 relative to the 
benchmark grade, time trend, seasonal dummy and conditional variance (risk) associated with 
the regression residual  t ò
3, respectively. In particular, t selectp , 2t yg  and  5 t yg p  capture the 
informational disparity over quality; the logarithm of  t h is considered as a proxy for risk.  
Durbin-Watson test statistics based on preliminary regression indicate that error terms  t ò  
are auto-correlated. Q and LM test statistics show that a significant ARCH effect is present in the 
residuals of the regression. The following EGARCH(q,p) model is employed to account for the 
above effects.  
1
N




  òò   (2) 
                                                       
3 Conditional variance  t h  is defined precisely by the EGARCH model in Equations (2) and (3).  8 
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where  ~ .. . (0,1) t e iid N .  
Additionally, the EGARCH model has two desirable features that are not available in the 
traditional GARCH model. First, the parameters in (3) are not restricted to be positive; Second, 
the item in parenthesis “| | | | t i t i e E e   ” captures the asymmetric effect of residual shock on 
conditional variance. In particular, the asymmetry exists when the coefficient of  ti e   is  1    for 
0 ti e    and  1   for 0 ti e   .   
Lastly, we determine the appropriate order of lags in Equations (1) through (3). For the 
regression model (Equation 1), we choose three lags of  t RevD  with coefficients at least 
significant at the 5% level. For the model of auto-correlated errors (Equation 2), we first assume 
constant  t h and then run the regression model with auto-correlated errors. We remove 
insignificant lags from a maximum length of 13 based on backward elimination. More 
specifically, we retain the first four lags for the choice dataset and the third and fourth orders for 
the select dataset. For the EGARCH model (Equation 3), we employ the minimum number of 
lags while ensuring the normality of the residual t e . It amounts to the choice of q=9 and p=1 for 
the choice dataset and q=9 and p=4 for the select dataset.  
Using the above settings, we verify the fitness of the EGARCH-in-Mean regression 
model, reported in table 4. The respective model fits the choice dataset better than the select 
dataset according to the substantially lower regression errors (SSE, MSE, MAE and MAPE) and 
higher R-square. The significance of Jacque-Berra normality test is 0.91 and 0.80 for the choice 
and select datasets, respectively. We cannot reject the null hypothesis of normality of residual t e , 
which confirms the critical normality assumption of the EGARCH model.  
Table 4 
Empirical Results 
The summary statistics presented in table 3 are consistent with the empirical literature on grid 
pricing.  Summary statistics reflect long-run marketing outcomes for two pens of cattle holding 
carcass quality attributes constant over time. Empirical evidence indicates that higher quality 
cattle are rewarded on a grid and lower quality cattle are penalized relative to selling at an 
average price. Regardless of cattle quality revenue variability is higher when marketing on a 
grid.  
  The summary statistics also provide insight on the relationship between financial risk and 
carcass quality uncertainty. Assume the producer is uncertain about the carcass quality of his/her 9 
 
cattle and the producer owns both the choice and select pens. Summary statistics indicate that 
there is a $23.77 per-head price differential between marketing above average cattle on a grid 
relative to selling below average cattle on a grid (table 3: $963.31-939.54).  This per-head price 
differential represents the mean of the statistical range in per-head average price per-pen.  if the 
producer is uncertain about the carcass quality of the cattle he/she is selling, then this price 
differential represents the per-head financial risk the producer faces.  On the other hand, 
comparing revenue from selling below and above average cattle at an average price resulted in 
only an 84 cent HCWP per-head differential between pens. In this case, the financial risk the 
producer faces is zero, because this differential is the result of the minimal weight difference 
across pens.  
The EGARCH-in-Mean regression model is estimated using maximum likelihood. The 
results for the choice and select datasets are reported in the left and right panels of table 5, 
respectively. We analyze the regression results before presenting the EGARCH model. All 
results are compared between the two datasets.  
Table 5 
Regression Results: Grid Premiums and Discounts 
 
In table 5, the estimated coefficient for the choice-select discount  t selectp  is 1.544 for the choice 
dataset vs. -0.540 for the select dataset. The choice-select discount essentially functions as a 
market signal on the current price differential between carcasses with a higher percentage in the 
level of intramuscular fat and carcasses with a low level. The grid pricing literature has 
documented that is quality grade price differential is the dominant carcass characteristic 
explaining per-head revenue variability (e.g. Johnson and Ward 2005 & 2006).  The economic 
intuition for the empirical estimates for  t selectp  indicates for a one dollar increase in the choice 
premium (select discount); a) the per-head price differential (the incentive to market on a grid) 
for the choice pen increases by $1.54, and b) the per-head price differential (the disincentive to 
market on a grid) for the select pen increases by $0.54.  
Our empirical estimates clearly indicate that change in the choice/select spread alters the 
financial risk producers‟ face when deciding to sell cattle on a grid or market by the pen.  
Assume current markets conditions are consistent with $23.77 per-head price differential 
between marketing above average cattle on a grid relative to below average cattle.  A one dollar 
increase (decrease) in the choice/select discount will increase (decrease) the per-head price 
differential to $25.85 ($21.69). We conclude that the incentive structure for marketing high (low) 
quality grade cattle on a grid relative to selling by the pen strengthens (weakens) as the 
choice/select discount increases.  
Empirical estimates for the yield grade premium and discount variables indicate they do 
affect the per head price differential ( t RevD ) for the choice and select pens.  The premium “yg2” 10 
 
for high yielding (boneless retail cuts) carcasses has a positive relationship with the per head 
revenue differential for both the choice and select pens.  As in the case of the choice/select 
spread, our empirical estimates indicate that a change in “yg2” premium affects the incentive 
(disincentive) to sell cattle on a grid (by the pen).  A one dollar increase “yg2” in the premium 
will decrease the per-head price differential for the select pen by $2.63. This reduces the 
incentive to market the select pen live weight to $2.70 (based on -$5.33 statistical mean grid 
discount). On the other hand, for the choice pen, the incentive to market on a grid increases by 
$1.46.  Thus, an increase in the “yg2” premium by one dollar reduces the financial risk a 
producer faces if there is uncertainty concerning the level of carcass quality. Assuming 
uncertainty over carcass quality, the financial risk decreases (the grid price differential between 
the choice and select pens) when the yg2 premium increases. Financial risk declines from $23.77 
per-head to $22.60.  We conclude that the incentive structure for marketing on a grid relative to 
selling by the pen strengthens (weakens) as the “yg2” premium increases (decreases).  
The final grid price variable included in the model is yield grade 5 (yg5p) and it is 
negative for both the choice and the select models. A one dollar increase in the “yg5p” discount 
will reduce the incentive to sell the choice pen on a grid by $0.52. Given the statistical mean for 
the grid premium for the choice pen is $17.27, an increase in this discount will only have a 
minimal effect of the incentive to market the choice pen on a grid. However, for the select pen, 
the disincentive increases by $0.85.  For the select pen, there is a $5.33 incentive to sell by the 
pen. This increase to $6.18 for a one dollar increase in “yg5p”, ceteris paribus. The financial risk 
(the grid price differential between the choice and select pens) of an increase in the yg5 discount 
increases when there is uncertainty over carcass quality by $1.37, from $23.77 per-head to 
$25.14.  We conclude that the incentive structure for marketing on a grid relative to selling by 
the pen weakens (strengthens) as the “yg5p” discount increases (decreases).  
One interesting results stands out; an increase in the choice carcass premium and yield 
grade 3 premium have the opposite effect on the producer‟s incentive to market on a grid. This 
inherent conflict in the structure of the grid pricing system appears to be a “barrier to adoption” 
that has not be identified in the previous literature.   
Regression Results: Time Trend and Seasonality 
 
The literature has yet to answer the question: is the incentive structure of the grid pricing system 
evolving over time? The time trend in the regression can help address such a question. From 
Table 5, we find that T  is a significant factor for both datasets. During the sample period (2001-
2008), the positive (negative) revenue differential became larger (smaller) for the choice (select) 
quality cattle. This implies that the incentive for marketing high (low) quality cattle on the grid 
(pen) gains has strengthened over time. In a recent article by Fausti et al. (2010a), it is reported 
that grid market share of steer and heifer slaughter volume increased from 35.8% in 2004 to 
38.8% in 2008.  The increase in grid market share of slaughter volume is consistent with our 
empirical finding that the incentive mechanism for marketing on the grid has strengthened and 11 
 
the incentive to market by the pen has declined during the period covered in the data. 
Documentation of the evolving nature of the grid pricing system‟s incentive mechanism opens 
additional opportunities for additional research on this issue.  
Peel and Meyer (2002) discuss the seasonal pattern in fed cattle prices; price is lower in 
the summer and higher otherwise. The revenue differential doesn‟t follow the same seasonal 
pattern and has been discussed in the gird pricing literature. In our model, the seasonal dummy 
DS is defined as 1 between June and December, and 0 otherwise. The DS coefficients for both 
datasets are statistically significant at the 2% level and negative. Therefore, the revenue 
differential does exhibit seasonality. The negative coefficient of DS implies that the revenue 
differential for choice pen is lower, i.e., a slight decline (-$0.59) in the incentive to market on a 
grid in the summer and fall.  For the select pen the negative coefficient implies the incentive to 
market by the pen slightly increases between June and December. These results are consistent 
with previous seasonal patterns reported in the literature (e.g., Fausti and Qasmi 2002).  
EGARCH-in-Mean Model Results and Implications for Marketing Risk 
The EGARCH-in-Mean model can be decomposed into five effects: the ARCH effect , the 
GARCH effect , the sign effect t e  , the size effect
4 | | | | tt e E e  and risk premium () t ln h  . The 
majority of the nine ARCH coefficients are positive for both datasets, implying that the past 
shocks amplify the conditional variance t h . The GARCH coefficient is (largely) negative for the 
choice (select) dataset, indicating that the conditional variance exhibits a mean-reverting pattern. 
The sign (or asymmetry) effect is different between the choice and select datasets: negative for 
the former and negative for the latter. The conditional variance of the residuals for the choice 
dataset increases in response to negative shocks. Conversely, the conditional variance of the 
residuals for the select dataset reacts more to positive shocks. Assuming that conditional variance 
is a proxy for the risk, the risk premium associated with logarithm of  t h  is significantly negative 
for the select dataset, although insignificant for the choice dataset. One view of this result is that 
sellers of select cattle are more willing to market their cattle by the pen in order to avoid an even 
larger penalty on the grid. The EGARCH model verifies the view in the literature that carcass 
quality uncertainty injects financial risk into the marketing decision and this risk 
disproportionally affects lower quality cattle. Thus, producer uncertainty over the quality of 
cattle they are marketing marks selling them on a grid inherently risky.  
Table 5 
Summary 
There are three cash market pricing alternatives that producers have to select from when 
marketing their fed cattle (live weight, dressed weight, and grid). The coexistence of pen level 
                                                       
4 Here we fix the magnitude of the size effect to be “1”, instead of a multiplication (of  | | | | tt e E e  ) for 
simplicity.  12 
 
pricing system with the individual animal gird pricing system is an obstacle in the path of the 
beef industry‟s goal of transforming itself into a value based production and marketing system.  
Selling cattle at an average price by the pen is still very appealing to producers who are risk 
averse, lack the financial capital to adopt value based production technology, or lack economies 
of scale to gain access to marketing outlets that offer a grid pricing alternative (See Fausti et al. 
2010 for additional discussion on these issues). However, changes in the grid incentive structure 
can mitigate these barriers. The empirical evidence suggests that the grid pricing system 
incentive structure is evolving to overcome these barriers to adoption.  
Empirical results suggest that the grid premium and discount structure is slowly adjusting 
its carcass quality incentive/disincentive to encourage marketing on a grid and discourage 
marketing by the pen at an average price.  If this trend continues, grid market share of steer and 
heifer slaughter volume should increase in the future.  
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Table 1. Summary Statistics: Cattle Carcass Attributes          
 
Data Set/ Variable  N  Mean  Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
Select Data Set:           
   HCW  1500  718.57  74.61  478.00  964.00 
   QG  1500  2.70  0.53  1.00  4.00 
   YG  1500  2.66  0.64  0.64  5.06 
Choice Data Set: 
             HCW  1500  719.37  73.84  478.00  964.00 
   QG  1500  2.35  0.52  1.00  4.00 
   YG  1500  2.78  0.62  0.64  5.06 
           
            Table 2. Summary Statistics: National Carcass Premiums and Discounts for 
Slaughter Steers and Heifers ($ per hundred weight) 
Variable  N  Mean  Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
            Choice/Select   381  -9.81  4.44  -24.87  -2.84 
YG 1-2  381  2.88  0.29  1.89  4.30 
YG>5  381  -18.47  0.73  -22.71  -16.55 
               16 
 
           
Table 3. Summary Statistics           
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
Select Data Set: 
          GRIDREV  381  939.54  115.22  698.71  1240.62 
SDGRIDRE  381  106.65  13.58  79.56  155.48 
HCWREV  381  944.87  114.91  702.75  1253.61 
SDHCW  381  98.11  11.93  72.97  130.16 
DIFFREV*  381  -5.33  3.66  -18.54  3.20 
Grid/HCW*  381  -0.01  0.00  -0.02  0.00 
DIFFSD
*  381  8.54  5.12  3.30  48.40 
Choice Data Set: 
          GRIDREV  381  963.31  118.12  714.40  1291.02 
SDGRIDRE  381  108.94  14.07  81.11  153.94 
HCWREV  381  945.71  114.57  703.54  1192.50 
SDHCW  381  97.11  11.82  72.21  128.81 
DIFFREV*  381  17.27  8.37  -3.64  42.36 
Grid/HCW*  381  0.02  0.01  0.00  0.12 
DIFFSD*  381  11.83  6.01  3.02  36.84 
             
Table 4. Model Diagnostics 
     
   Choice          Select    
OBS  378.00 
 
378.00 
  LogLik  -504.94 
 
-541.47 
  SSE  411.31 
 
636.29 
  MSE  1.09 
 
1.68 
  MAE  0.76 
 
0.89 
  MAPE  4.80 
 
44.28 
  R-Sq.  0.98 
 
0.88 
  SBC  1164.19 
 
1243.18 
  AIC  1061.89 
 
1136.93 
  AICC  1065.89 
 
1141.25 
  J-B Test  0.19    0.45   
Pr >   0.91     0.80    
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Table 5. EGARCH-in-Mean Regression Results 
  Choice  Select 
Variable  Estimate 
Std. 
Error.  t-value  prob.  Estimate 
Std. 
Error.  t-value  prob. 
Constant  1.361  0.020  69.53  <.0001  3.702  0.003  1160.34  <.0001 
1 t RevD    0.057  0.026  2.15  0.0300  0.433  0.001  331.98  <.0001 
2 t RevD    -0.089  0.029  -3.11  0.0020  0.059  0.004  15.02  <.0001 
3 t RevD    0.061  0.016  3.84  0.0001  -0.208  0.002  -89.06  <.0001 
selectp  1.544  0.039  39.94  <.0001  -0.540  0.005  -105.03  <.0001 
yg2  1.462  0.150  9.73  <.0001  2.635  0.003  828.72  <.0001 
yg5p  -0.520  0.065  -8.01  <.0001  -0.849  0.002  -397.76  <.0001 
T  0.016  0.003  5.65  <.0001  0.013  0.000  65.70  <.0001 
DS  -0.587  0.244  -2.41  0.0160  -0.237  0.003  -77.72  <.0001 
1    -0.647  0.040  -16.09  <.0001  -  -  -  - 
2    -0.250  0.043  -5.81  <.0001  -  -  -  - 
3    0.009  0.034  0.28  0.7800  -0.436  0.002  -255.92  <.0001 
4    -0.040  0.038  -1.04  0.3000  -0.387  0.002  -190.78  <.0001 
   -0.153  0.080  -1.91  0.0600  0.002  0.003  0.47  0.6400 
1    0.511  0.088  5.81  <.0001  0.941  0.005  194.30  <.0001 
2    0.618  0.077  8.05  <.0001  1.099  0.003  322.91  <.0001 
3    0.639  0.101  6.32  <.0001  1.232  0.009  137.98  <.0001 
4    0.138  0.096  1.44  0.1500  0.841  0.003  310.61  <.0001 
5    -0.029  0.062  -0.46  0.6400  0.023  0.004  6.33  <.0001 
6    0.031  0.077  0.40  0.6900  0.000  0.005  0.02  0.9800 
7    0.186  0.115  1.62  0.1100  -0.334  0.004  -82.37  <.0001 
8    -0.079  0.099  -0.80  0.4200  -0.282  0.003  -85.46  <.0001 
9    0.376  0.119  3.15  0.0000  0.074  0.004  18.90  <.0001 
1    -0.041  0.074  -0.55  0.5800  -0.602  0.004  -145.31  <.0001 
2    -  -  -  -  -0.476  0.006  -74.93  <.0001 
3    -  -  -  -  -0.165  0.008  -20.76  <.0001 
4    -  -  -  -  0.518  0.004  120.99  <.0001 
   -0.136  0.058  -2.34  0.0200  0.035  0.003  11.47  <.0001 
   -0.043  0.056  -0.76  0.4500  -0.256  0.004  -61.56  <.0001 
 